Consider the following signaling game. Assume z=0.4. Equilibrium can be characterized as ________________.  

Who said “Give me Liberty or give me Death”

Consider a vote being taken by three roommates, A, B, and C, who share a triple dorm room. They are trying to decide which of three elective courses to take together this term. (Each roommate has a different major and is taking required courses in her major for the rest of her courses.) Their choices are Philosophy, Geology, and Sociology, and their preferences for the three courses are as shown here:   The roommates have decided to have a two-round vote and will draw straws to determine who sets the agenda. Suppose C sets the agenda and wants the Geology course to be chosen. How should she set the agenda to achieve this outcome if she knows that everyone will vote strategically in all rounds? In the first round, C should set up _____________. 

If a star is 10 parsecs away, how long ago did the light we see from it tonight begins its journey toward us?

The strategy of concealing information in asymmetric information games is called screening.

Consider the following prisoners’ dilemma game. A penalty greater than _____ should be imposed for confessing (defecting) so that the cooperative outcome can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome. Enter a positive number for the penalty.  

Consider the binary commuter route choice game. If the number of players in the main and side road are in accordance with equilibrium entries, the marginal private gain associated with changing roads for a commuter is non-negative.

Suppose Rio is a risk-averse agent and owns a lottery that he could play. The lottery pays either $25 or $13 with equal chance. Rio would be willing to sell the lottery only if he is offered a payment greater than the expected value of the lottery.

Why do Cepheid variables have that strange name?

Consider a two-player infinitely repeated game between A and B that involves only two strategies – cooperate and defect. Player A employs an open Tit-for-Tat strategy (oTFT – begin the relationship by cooperating, and in each future period choose the action that was chosen by the rival in the preceding period of play) and player B employs a closed Tit-for-Tat strategy (cTFT – begin the relationship by defecting, and in each future period choose the action that was chosen by the rival in the preceding period of play). In the long-term, the cooperative outcome is attainable.