What is the benefit of thinking of Credibility in terms of t…
What is the benefit of thinking of Credibility in terms of tokens? Please be complete in your answer for full credit
What is the benefit of thinking of Credibility in terms of t…
Questions
Whаt is the benefit оf thinking оf Credibility in terms оf tokens? Pleаse be complete in your аnswer for full credit
Nаme аt leаst three advantages оf criminal prоcedures.
Instructiоns: 1. Rereаd Rоdriguez v. United Stаtes. This cаse included in Chapter 1. Facts оf the case On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop. Question Is the use of a K-9 unit, after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures? Conclusion Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the use of a K-9 unit at the conclusion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it was conducted reasonably, which this one was. Justice Thomas also argued that the rule announced in the majority’s opinion would result in arbitrary enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections and created artificial lines between common police practices at traffic stops. Additionally, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case because the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue to hold Rodriguez and use the K-9 unit. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the appellate court did not address the issue of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to use the K-9 unit, and that court should be allowed to do so. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s analysis was arbitrary because it relied on the order in which the officer conducted his inquiries. 2. If you were the Police Chief, what new policy would you implement in your department about similar cases? Note: I am NOT asking you to summarize this case. There is NO need for it. Ia m simply asking you to tell me what the new policy will be. A good policy must simple and clear enough. For example: IF an XYZ situation happens, this is how officers must handle it constitutionally". Four (4) good sentences must be enough.
Why dо the pоlice need а seаrch wаrrant tо search blood but no search warrant to search breath? Your answer must be based upon the current interpretation by the US Supreme Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota. Explain the rationale behind the US Supreme Court decision. You can listen to Birchfield v. North Dakota here: Rationale = reasoning = the logical basis for the decision Birchfield v. North Dakota Opinion Announcement - June 23, 2016 John G. Roberts, Jr. And Justice Alito has the opinions of the court in case 14-1468, Birchfield versus North Dakota and the consolidated cases. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. These are three cases; Birchfield versus North Dakota, Bernard versus Minnesota and Beylund versus Levi. They concern a new strategy that several states have adopted to combat the problem of drunk driving. All states have long made it a crime to drive a car with a blood alcohol concentration or BAC that exceeds a certain percentage. And because states need to measure drivers’ BAC to enforce such laws, all states also have what are called implied consent laws, which require suspected drunk drivers to cooperate with BAC testing, usually through a Breathalyzer test or a blood draw. In the past the standard penalty for refusing such a test was revocation of a driver's license. The laws at issue in these cases, however, increase the penalty and make it a crime to refuse a BAC test. All three petitioners here were arrested for drunk driving and asked to take such a test. The first Danny Birchfield was asked to submit to a blood test, he refused. The second William Robert Bernard Jr. was asked to submit to a breath test, and he also refused. The third, Steve Michael Beylund was asked to submit to a blood test. Unlike the other petitioners he agreed to take the test after being told that refusal would be a crime. In none of the three cases did the police have a search warrant authorizing the test that they demanded. The first two petitioners Birchfield and Bernard were criminally prosecuted for refusing to take the test. The third Beylund was prosecuted because his blood test revealed a BAC far in excess of the legal limit. North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Birchfield and Beylund and the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld Bernard's conviction. We granted certiorari in all three cases. Success for each of the petitioners depends on the proposition that the criminal law ordinarily may not compel a motorist to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test unless the police first obtain a search warrant. In our decision today we agree with that proposition insofar as it relates to blood draws but not when it comes to breath tests. This Court's Fourth Amendment cases have held that warrantless searches are generally unconstitutional unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. In today's decision we focus on how one of these recognized exceptions, the exception for searches incident to law for arrest applies in drunk driving cases. Since the nation's founding, police have been permitted, without obtaining a warrant, to search a person who has been lawfully arrested. Among other things this kind of search allows police to collect evidence showing that the arrestee committed the crime for which he was arrested. Of course, the kind of search we deal with here, a test of the arrestee's breath or blood, was not known when the Fourth Amendment was ratified. We determine whether searches like this are permissible searches incident to an arrest by weighing the degree to which they intrude on the arrestee's privacy against the degree to which they promote legitimate governmental interests. Starting with the privacy side of the balance we conclude that breath tests constitute very little intrusion on privacy interests. They are not painful or inherently embarrassing and they collect a substance that the arrestee would otherwise give up through the normal process of breathing. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive. They require piercing the skin of the person arrested and they extract blood, a substance that the person would normally retain. On the other side of the balance, states have a compelling interest in fighting drunk driving which claims thousands of lives every year and injures countless more. BAC testing provides crucial evidence for determining whether a person arrested on suspicion of drunk driving is guilty of that crime, and so BAC tests fit within one of the classic justifications for warrantless searches incident to arrest. That is they preserve evidence that the arrestee is guilty of the crime for which he was arrested, evidence that would otherwise disappear with the passage of time as the alcohol in the arrestee's bloodstream naturally dissipates. Moreover because the more severe punishment that states now imposed, that some states now imposed on most dangerous drunk drivers, that is those with very high BAC levels and those who are recidivists, because this more severe punishment imposed for these serious offenders gives those drivers are strong incentive not to let their blood alcohol concentration be tested. States need effective tools to ensure drivers’ cooperation with blood alcohol concentration testing. Petitioners argue that states should nevertheless be obligated to obtain warrant whenever possible before insisting that drivers submit to BAC testing. But our cases make clear that the applicability of the search incident to arrest doctrine does not depend on the specifics of the particular case. Moreover, petitioners’ proposal would constitute a significant burden on courts and magistrates who would have to be available to issue search warrants 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, particularly in rural areas this burden might unduly impact the other important work of the courts. And for reasons explained in the opinion requiring a warrant in every drunk driving case would not provide any commensurate benefit. Still because the less intrusive breath test serves the state's interest in prosecuting drunk drivers just as well as the more intrusive blood test we hold that warrantless breath tests are permissible searches incident to arrest but blood tests are not. For these reasons and others set forth in our opinion we conclude that Birchfield may not be criminally convicted for refusing to submit to an unlawful warrantless blood draw. We reverse the North Dakota Supreme Court's judgment affirming his conviction. Bernard on the other hand was convicted for refusing a warrantless breath test which he had no Fourth Amendment right to refuse. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court affirming his conviction. Beylund agreed to take a blood test but only after the police advised him that the state could criminally prosecute him for test refusal. Because that advice was at least partially inaccurate given our holding today, we vacate the judgment affirming his conviction so that the North Dakota Supreme Court may reconsider on remand whether Beylund's consent was sufficiently voluntary to justify the warrantless blood test. Justice Sotomayor has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Justice Ginsburg joins. Justice Thomas has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and in part and dissenting in part.